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THE BASES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING: THE NEED FOR A
REAPPRAISAL
JAMES W. WITT*
When Judge John Sirica announced that the basic purpose
of the Watergate trials was to bring to light the truth and only
incidentally to determine the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dants,' the erratic subjectivity of judgment attributed to many
of our activist jurists in recent years became obvious to even
the most casual observer of our courts. Prior activist courts
have been content to pass on the sapience of legislative acts
and impose constitutional doctrines upon subjective individual
judgment. However, Judge Sirica advanced judicial activism
one step further when he used "end justifies the means" juris-
prudence to dislodge the keystone of Anglo-American justice,
i.e., the accusatorial trial procedure.
Under our legal system the sole purpose for bringing a per-
son to trial is to determine whether or not the evidence proves
that the individual committed the specific crime with which he
has been charged. To this end, strict rules of evidence have
been adopted to protect the sanctity of our accusatorial system
against the possibility of inquisitorial encroachments by the
government. It is, therefore, a perversion of our criminal court
system to use it for any purpose other than to try a particular
defendant on a particular charge. Judge Sirica's comments on
the Watergate trials present the student of the courts with a
clear manifestation of the need for re-examining the merits of
the doctrine of judicial self-restraint.
Operationally, the doctrine of judicial self-restraint implies
the recognition by our jurists that the structural-functional
limitations of our court system mandate a detachment from
* B.A. 1961, Loyola University of Los Angeles; M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1970, University
of Southern California; Executive Director, Center for Criminal Justice Agency Organ-
ization and Minority Employment Opportunities, Marquette University Law School.
Dr. Witt has extensive experience as an educator and consultant in the areas of crimi-
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Sept. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
intervention into the affairs of state and local government.2 The
doctrine also posits the belief that, "[t]he Court is the place
for principled judgment, disciplined by the method of reason
familiar to the discourse of moral philosophy, and in constitu-
tional adjudication, the place for only that, or else its insula-
tion from the political process is inexplicable. ' '3
The purpose of this article is to examine one of the major
considerations for judicial self-restraint, namely, that our
courts do not have the adequate fact-finding facilities neces-
sary for making enlightened policy choices.' This will be ac-
complished in the context of one controversial Supreme Court
decision in the area of criminal procedure-Miranda v.
Arizona.' Such a narrow focus should not distract the reader
from the author's major premise, which is that judicial self-
restraint should become the norm for judicial decision-making
in all areas of the law.
I. SUPREME COURT SUPPOSITIONS REGARDING POLICE
INTERROGATIONS PRACTICES
The major hypothesis upon which the Miranda decision
rests is that police interrogation methods in general are harrow-
ing and violative of a suspect's rights against self-
incrimination.' By imputing illegal motives to police interroga-
tors, the Court apparently felt that certain universal and unsa-
vory practices were being employed to secure custodial state-
ments. These practices are commonly termed the "third de-
gree." 7
2. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
HARV. L. REV. Oct. 25, 1893, at 17 passim.
3. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
4. See, e.g., the comments of the late Justice Frankfurter in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343, 365-66 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Id. at 445-66.
7. In the context of this paper, the term "third degree" means the use of physical
or psychological coercion to extort confessions or statements. Etymologically, the word
is believed to be derived from the ceremony conferring the third degree of Ma-
sonry-the Master Mason. See The Third Degree, 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1049
(1972). Professor Wigmore took note of an evolution in the meaning of the term, i.e.,
from a term connoting the use of some sort of violence in securing confessions to one
applicable to "any process of simple interrogation." See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 314 (3d ed. rev. 1940). For some representative publications
on the subject see H. BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT (1930); Parrot, Approval and
Disapproval of the Third Degree Practices, 28 J. CR1M. L. C. & P. S. 526 (1937); Booth,
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The Court premised its supposition on three principal
sources of empirical data: (1) police manuals and texts, (2) the
1931 report of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement, and (3) prior confession cases.8
A. Police Manuals and Textbooks
In Miranda, the Court cites the fact that generally police
interrogations are conducted in a setting of "privacy" and "se-
crecy." 9 As a means for discerning what transpires within the
inner sanctum of the station house, the Court looks to several
"police manuals and texts" that describe and prescribe interro-
gation procedures." In dicta, the Court delineates several psy-
chological procedures recommended in police textbooks for
successfully interrogating suspects and expounds upon the
dangers of these procedures."
The Court seemingly assumed that the corroborating text-
books and manuals were extensively utilized by law enforce-
ment officers."2 This, however, was not generally the case. In
1966 there were approximately one hundred institutions of
higher learning throughout the country offering police-oriented
higher education programs.'3 Most of these courses of instruc-
tion were housed in two-year degree programs and nearly one-
third were in the California State College system. The author
had seven years police experience with three different agencies
Confessions and the Methods Employed in Procuring Them, 4 S. CAL. L. REv. 83
(1930); Doyle, The Third Degree-Its Historical Background, The Present Law and
Recommendations, 43 Ky. L. J. 392 (1955); E. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE (1931);
Note, The Third Degree, 43 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1930); Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954); Potts, The Preliminary
Examination and "The Third Degree," 2 BAYLOR L. REv. 131 (1950).
8. One could assume that a Justice's prior assessment of police interrogation prac-
tices would most likely be evident in his later decisions relative to the same topic. For
example, Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36,
46 (1951) stated: "What happens behind doors that are opened and closed at the sole
discretion of the police is a black chapter in every country ....
9. 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
10. Id. at 448-49.
11. Id. at 448-55. One writer has found a notable similarity between the recommen-
dations of the various police manuals and texts and similar works used by Russian and
Chinese interrogators. See Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of
Confession, 14 J. PUB. L. 25 passim (1965).
12. 384 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1966).
13. Brandstatter, History of Police Science Degree Programs in the United States,
POLICE SCIENCE DEGREE PROGRAMS: A CONFERENCE REPORT 17 (1968).
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prior to the Miranda decision. Much of this work was investiga-
tive in nature. During this interval the author never had the
occasion to utilize any of the materials cited by the Court. In
fact, he was not even aware of them. Generally, investigative
techniques were learned from experienced personnel.
The weakness of the Court's argument was noted by one
Justice in dissent when he stated, "[n]ot one [textbook or
manual] is shown by the record . . . to be the official manual
of any police department, much less in universal use in crime
detection."'"
B. Report of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement-193115
As further evidence of what possibly took place in the "se-
crecy" of the interrogation room, the Court cited the findings
of the 1931 Wickersham Report. 6 This report was the product
of the Wickersham Commission that was appointed for two
years (June, 1929 to June, 1931) to study the problem of crimi-
nal law enforcement in the United States. It was the first com-
prehensive investigation of crime and criminal justice in Amer-
ica. 7
After examining some eighty books, articles, and numerous
press stories, studying the results of some sixty-seven appellate
court cases in which the use of third-degree methods to extort
confessions was evident, and scrutinizing police interrogation
procedures in fifteen cities, the Commission concluded that the
use of the third-degree was extensive in the United States. 8 In
another report, the Commission criticized police organization,
administration, and personnel. 19
14. 384 U.S. 436, 499 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).
15. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REPORT, 4
vols. (1931) [hereinafter cited as the WICKERSHAM REPORT].
16. 384 U.S. 436, 445-48 (1966). Specifically, the Court cites IV WICKERSHAM RE-
PORT No. 11, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931).
17. See Reports on the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1931) for an excellent analysis of the Commission's
fourteen reports.
18. See Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, supra note 16, at 4. See also
Camp, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement-No. 11, 17 A.B.A.J. 865 (1932) for similar
comments.
19. Report on Police, supra note 15. For a good analysis of this report, see Vollmer,
Abstract of the "Wickersham" Police Report, 22 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 716 (1932).
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Although the Commission put forth a commendable effort
under adverse conditions, 2 a thorough analysis of the Report
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement reveals serious methodol-
ogical defects. For example, in reaching the conclusion that
third-degree methods were widely utilized by the police, the
Commission conducted very little direct empirical investiga-
tion of factual situations. Instead, it relied principally on sec-
ondary data sources. One critic of the Report states, "the reli-
ance of the Commission's consultants upon 'books and articles'
written by others, to amplify the negligible evidence of the
relatively few authenticated cases, is both unscientific and
misleading.' '1
In seeking information relative to current police interroga-
tion procedures, it would be somewhat questionable to place
any reliance upon a report based primarily upon secondary
sources and rendered over three decades ago.
C. Past Confession Cases Decided by the Court
The "incommunicado police dominated atmosphere"
within which custodial interrogation takes place was the focal
point of the Miranda decision. In dicta, the Court stated that
even without physical or psychological coercion, "custodial in-
terrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
on the weakness of individuals. ' 2  Heavy reliance was, there-
fore, placed upon the facts in past and contemporary confes-
sion cases as a means of supporting the Court's contention.'
The dangers inherent in using a court's past experiences as
a means of authenticating a blanket violation of individual
rights is exemplified in the following statement by a federal
district court judge:
The Court, by virtue of its selectively controlled calendar, is
unfortunately the recipient of a disproportionate number of
police brutality cases. Conversely, the overwhelming major-
ity of cases which involve no instances of police brutality or
20. See Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, supra note 16, at 21-24 for a
thorough discussion of the Commission's problems.
21. See Waite, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 30 MICH. L. REv. 57
(1931).
22. 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
23. Id. at 466.
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oppression of rights are ... seldom, if ever, presented to the
Court. 4
If the Court had adequate research support, what data rela-
tive to police interrogation practices would have been available
from the various congressional committees and governmental
commissions for the Court's consideration?" The remainder of
this article will be directed toward an examination of such
resource materials.
II. PUBLIC INVESTIGATIONS OF POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
A. The 1943 House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearings26
In 1943 the United States House of Representatives con-
ducted hearings in regard to the controversial Hobbs Bill,
which proposed the nullification of the equally contentious
McNabb rule. This rule resulted from the decision in McNabb
v. United States,2 which held that evidence obtained between
arrest and arraignment was not admissible in federal cases, if
a defendant had not been immediately taken before a magis-
trate. These were the first hearings of any consequences per-
taining to improper police practices and procedures subsequent
to the Wickersham Report.
No credible empirical evidence of improper police practices
was presented during the five-day session. Several opponents
of the Hobbs Bill representing organized labor expressed oppo-
sition to illegal incommunicado detention generally. In order to
buttress their argument, references were made to a case in
which F.B.I. agents allegedly utilized the "evil effects" of un-
lawful detention to secure confessions from strikers. 8 The crux
24. See the statement of J. Campbell in the Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1491
(1967).
25. In only one instance was any of these sources of data cited by the Court in
Miranda. See 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966).
26. Hearings, Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases Before Subcomm. No. 2 of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) [hereinafter cited as the 1943
House Hearings].
27. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
28. Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943). In this case several union
members were arrested and convicted for blowing up TVA power poles that were
servicing a struck mine. The union contended that the arrests were part of a plot to
break the strike, and convictions resulted from coerced confessions, i.e., psychological
coercion emanating from illegal incommunicado detention and prolonged questioning
in a "hostile atmosphere."
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of the labor spokesmen's position was "that the incommuni-
cado process can be used effectively against organized workers
to defeat their legal rights to struggle for collective bargaining,
when all the usual tricks of strike breaking and union smashing
have failed. 29 The major concern of the union spokesmen
seemed to rest more with the possible utilization of incommun-
icado detention and interrogation as a strike-breaking tool
rather than with improper police practices in securing confes-
sions.
Several attorneys testified against the proposed measure,
however, their testimony appears to have been rooted in their
own subjective fears and preconceptions rather than in con-
crete empirical data.31 One attorney contended that his client
was "brutally beaten by the police." Questioning by committee
members, however, revealed that this importunity could be
sustained only by the client and his relatives. In any event, the
allegation was not upheld by the court and the confession was
eventually admitted as evidence. 1
On the basis of these hearings the primary issue during this
period was not police brutality per se, but simply that incom-
municado detainment provides the opportunity for the police
to utilize inhumane methods.
B. Report of the President's Committee on Civil
Rights-194732
The next revelation that something might be amiss in the
inner sanctum of the station house came in 1947, when Presi-
dent Truman's Advisory Committee on Civil Rights reported
that third-degree methods were still being used to extort con-
fessions. The Committee also declared that police brutality,
although not universal, was still an actuality.13
The Committee's report was based upon data gleaned from
public hearings and information received from private citizens
and organizations, statements made by witnesses at private
29. 1943 House Hearings, supra note 26, at 87.
30. An example of this bias can be found in the following statement by one attor-
ney: "The police always shove around a suspect, especially a colored man." Id., at 69.
31. Id. at 65-67.
32. U.S. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS (1947) [hereinafter cited as the 1947 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT].
33. Id. at 20-27.
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conferences and "staff studies." The author, however, could
find no evidence that any actual "staff study" of police prac-
tices and procedures had been made. Accusations were made
of police improprieties, however, no empirical data were pre-
sented to support these charges. In fact, the Committee ac-
knowledged that the police had achieved some degree of suc-
cess in eliminating improper police practices.34
Although praiseworthy as an effort to stimulate the federal
government's interest in civil rights, the report offered no em-
pirical evidence that the police were utilizing improper and
illegal procedures.
C. The 1957 House Hearings Relating to the Mallory
Decision35
The 1957 decision in Mallory v. United States6 initiated
another round of hearings relating to police practices and pro-
cedures by the House of Representatives. In Mallory, the Court
held that a suspect in federal cases must be taken to a magis-
trate as soon as possible after arrest. Any "unnecessary delay"
would invalidate a confession obtained from an accused prior
to an appearance before a magistrate. The usual impressive
array of witnesses testified for and against modifications of this
rule.
From those testifying against any alteration of the Mallory
rule, the most revealing comments came from an attorney and
seven-year veteran of the Washington, D.C., Police Depart-
ment.31 Claiming personal knowledge of what transpired be-
hind the "closed doors" of the station house, the witness advo-
cated that restraints be placed upon the police. He made no
allegations that any wrongdoings were being perpetrated by the
police at the time of the hearings, but only that they had oc-
curred during his tenure as a police officer. The witness further
averred that the "illiterate" and those in the "lower economic-
status" were the groups sustaining the impact of civil rights
34. Id. at 25.
35. Hearings to Study Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States Before
a Special Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited
as the 1957 House Hearings].
36. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
37. See the testimony of James Scullen, 1957 House Hearings, supra note 35, at
152-57.
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violations by the police. The witness buttressed his point by
concluding, "I am utterly convinced that the moment a person
is under arrest by the police, he is in hostile hands. '38
A lengthy memorandum drafted by a committee of the
American Bar Association headed by the distinguished civil
libertarian Zechariah Chafee, Jr. was also offered in support of
the Mallory rule9.3 However, the document makes no allega-
tions of police misconduct and depicts the Mallory rule as
being a preventative measure against the possibility of impro-
per interrogation practices. 0
Several police officials and other witnesses testified for a
modification of the Mallory rule. The statements of one attor-
ney were particularly informative as to the practices of the
police in Washington, D.C., at that time. Testifying on behalf
of the District of Columbia Bar Association's Law Enforcement
Council, a committee established by the District Bar Associa-
tion to hear complaints relating to improper police procedures
in the District, the individual downgraded implications of po-
lice brutality made by previous attestants. In four years of
receiving complaints for the Council, the witness testified that
none contained imputations of "police brutality."'" The Coun-
cil's position was that "the Court's fear of illegal 'third-degree'
methods by Federal or District of Columbia law enforcement
officers . . . was without a basis or foundation in fact.""
The 1957 House hearings afforded some insights into what
transpires behind the "closed doors" of the station house. Two
general themes, however, pervaded most of the testimony: (1)
the need for measures such as the Mallory rule to prevent third-
degree tactics, and (2) the practical need for a limited period
of police interrogation before arraignment. The matter was re-
ferred to the Senate.
38. Id. at 155.
39. This memorandum is entitled On the Detention of Arrested Persons and Their
Production Before a Committing Magistrate. Id. at 261-63.
40. See especially id. at 261-63.
41. Id. at 159.
42. Id. at 158.
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D. The 1958 Senate Hearings Relating to the Mallory
Decision4 3
In 1958, Senate hearings were held to deal specifically with
the arrest and detention of suspects and confessions obtained
during detention. The usual parade of witnesses testified at the
hearings, including a prominent judge and a scholar.44
Once again the prevailing theme of those supporting the
Mallory rule was the prevention of police wrongdoings, not any
allegations that misfeasance was being perpetrated by the po-
lice. 5 There was only one claim of actual police misconduct,
and this was in the form of a letter to the Committee. 6 In this
correspondence an individual engaged in prison rehabilitative
work alleged that defendants in the District of Columbia were
being brutalized, coerced and victimized by third-degree meth-
ods. Reportedly, the sources for the information were aver-
ments from the witness' clientele. The end result was that the
hearings provided no real evidence of police wrongdoing.
E. The Report of the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights"
The 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Report was cited by
the majority in the Miranda decision as evidence that the po-
lice used coercion to elicit confessions. The Court declared
that, "[t]he 1961 Commission on Civil Rights found much
evidence to indicate that 'some policemen still resort to physi-
cal force to obtain confessions' . . . ."I What was this "evi-
dence" upon which the Commission based its conclusion?
An analysis of the Commission's report reveals that data
from several sources were cited as the basis for its assess-
43. Hearings, Confessions and Police Detention Before a Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter
cited as the 1958 Senate Hearings].
44. Federal District Judge Alexander Holtzoff testified against the Mallory rule
and Professor Arthur Sutherland testified for it.
45. This theme is particularly apparent in the statement of one attorney who said:
We don't have to fear in this country encroachments on our liberties by evil
minded, badly motivated people because we are always alert to them. We have
to fear encroachments on the liberty of individuals from well-meaning zealots
without understanding.
See the statement of E. Williams, the 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 98. Also
see the testimony of J. Silard, id. at 155-58 and J. Hogan, id. at 166-69.
46. Id. at 182.
47. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, JUSTICE (1961) [hereinafter cited as
the 1961 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT].
48. 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966).
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ment'-the 1931 Wickersham Report, the infamous Brown v.
Mississippi case,5 0 the twenty-one cases reversed between 1936
and 1961 due to allegations of coerced confessions, the success-
ful prosecution of two police officers under the Federal Civil
Rights Acts in the 1950's 5' and the Commission's Alabama
Advisory Committee Report.
The major original source of data used by the Commission
was the reports received from its fifty state advisory commit-
tees, which had been established under the 1957 Civil Rights
Act. In its report, the Alabama Advisory Committee was the
only reporting body to strongly intimate that the police were
using third-degree methods to extort confessions and engaging
in other forms of illegal practices.52 These conclusions were
reached as a result of the committee's perusal of information
obtained from questionnaires that had been forwarded to the
committee by "well-informed observers" throughout the state.
To the 120 questionnaires distributed, there were forty-six re-
sponses of which twenty-three reported that the police in their
jurisdiction used third-degree methods to extort confessions.
It is interesting to note that "the administration of justice"
was only one of the numerous topics considered by the various
advisory committees. Only twenty-two states, however, found
it necessary to even comment on the topic of police misconduct
and many of these remarks were favorable.53 Of these, only
seven reported instances of police brutality54 and only one, Ala-
bama, reported that the police were using third-degree meth-
ods to extract confessions.
49. See 1961 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 47, at 16-25.
50. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (where torture was used to extort confessions).
51. Pool v. United States, 260 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1958) and United States v. Lowery,
Crim. no. 13235 S. C. Tex., Feb. 19, 1958. Both of the parties in these actions were
small-town police chiefs who used physical coercion to obtain confessions.
52. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RiOHTS, THE FiFry STATES REPORT (1961)
[hereinafter cited as the FiFrY STATES REPORT].
53. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
54. Alabama, supra note 52; Delaware-scattered instances of brutality by some
"untrained policemen" in the southern part of the state, supra note 52, at 94; Missis-
sippi-many "unbelievable" reports of "atrocities" and "brutalities" by the police;
however, no specific instances were cited. Id. at 317; Missouri-some scattered com-
plaints concerning police brutality. Id. at 351; New Mexico-numerous complaints of
police brutalizing arrested Indians but none were verified. Id. at 425; South Caro-
lina-more general complaints of police brutality. Id. at 567; and Texas-there were a
"few" alleged violations of civil rights by the police. Id. at 596.
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The Commission summarized its findings regarding "un-
lawful police violence" in the United States as follows:
Police brutality-the unnecessary use of violence to enforce
the mores of segregation, to punish, and to coerce confes-
sions-is a serious problem in the United States . . . . Yet,
most policemen have demonstrated that it is possible to per-
form their duties effectively without resorting to unlawful
violence .... 11
The data utilized by the Commission to formulate this sum-
mary came from "the alleged facts in 11 typical cases of police
brutality." These "alleged facts" emanated from dicta in Su-
preme Court cases, press accounts of instances of alleged police
brutality, Justice Department files and transcripts, statements
of victims, independent studies, minutes from police commis-
sion hearings dealing with purported instances of police brutal-
ity, and the Commission's own investigations.
In view of the indeterminate and unreliable nature of the
materials used by the Commission to reach its findings, it is not
possible to draw any sound general conclusions about police
interrogation practices from its report. Anyone attempting to
resolve questions relating to the seriousness of police misfeas-
ance would have to judge the Commission's findings on the
basis of personal values. Perhaps this was the majority's ap-
proach in Miranda.
F. 1962 District of Columbia Report on Police Arrest for
Investigation56
Although it deals only with the procedure practiced by the
District of Columbia police in making arrests for investigation
and without warrants in felony cases, the Horsky Report- pro-
vides some insights into police behavior in the District of Col-
umbia. The report contained no allegations of police miscon-
duct. The major recommendation submitted by the Commit-
tee, that arrest for investigation be discontinued, was made on
the assumption that it would eliminate the possibility of the
third-degree. In fact, the Committee took pains to stress the
point that it was not alleging misconduct on the part of the
55. See 1961 CIVIL RIGwrs REPORT, supra note 47, at 28.
56. District of Columbia, COMMISSIONERS' COMMI'rEE ON ARREST FOR INVESTIGATION,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1962) [hereinafter cited as the HoRSKY REPORT].
57. Charles Horsky was the chairman of the committee conducting the inquiry.
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District police. A further manifestation of the Committee's
confidence in the District police is perceived by its failure to
propose procedures for carrying out its recommendations. Reli-
ance was placed solely on the "integrity" of the District police
to practice the new procedures. 9 In the ultimate, the Horsky
Committee's recommendations were not proposed as remedial
but as preventative measures, i.e., to prevent police misfeas-
ance and not eliminate an existent practice.
The Horsky Committee's work was the last investigation of
any consequence regarding police interrogation practices prior
to the Miranda decree.6" In the interest of effectuating a more
in-depth analysis of the problem, however, information gleaned
from hearings and commission reports subsequent to the
Miranda ruling will be offered below as further means for eval-
uating the Court's assessment of police interrogation proce-
dures in the Miranda decision.
II. PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO THE MIRANDA DECISION
RELATING TO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCEDURES
A. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice-19671
This eighteen-month study of crime in the United States
was the most intensive probe of the problem since the Wicker-
sham Report of 1931. The President's Crime Commission did
not deal with the subject of confessions or interrogations, 2 but
its report contains the supplemental viewpoints of seven
Commission members regarding the topic.3
The probings of the Commission were conducted by several
task forces, one of which carried out a comprehensive study of
American law enforcement. 4 This report of the Police Task
58. See HORSKY REPORT, supra note 56, at 46-47.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Hearings were conducted by the Senate Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedure in March and May of 1966 relative to admitting confessions as evidence. The
content of these hearings, however, is inconsequential to this study. See Hearings,
Criminal Law and Procedure Before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
61. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIEr (1967) [hereinafter cited as the
CRIME COMMISSION REPORT].
62. Id. at 94, where the Commission concludes that there is inadequate data for
dealing constructively with the problem.
63. Id. at 303-08.
64. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
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Force, like the general Commission report, does not delve into
the issues of station house interrogation or confessions. It does,
however, convey some judgments concerning police misfeas-
ance. The document concludes that:
The Commission [the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice] was not able to
determine the extent of physical abuse by policemen in this
country since recent studies have generally not been system-
atic. Earlier studies however, found that police brutality was
a significant problem . . . . The Commission believes that
physical abuse is not as serious a problem as it was in the
past. The few statistics which do exist suggest small numbers
of cases involving excessive use of force. Although the rela-
tively small number of reported complaints cannot be consid-
ered an accurate measure of the total problem, most persons
. . . believe that verbal abuse and harrassment, not excessive
use of force, is the major police-community relations problem
today."
It is interesting to note that a newspaper reporter reached the
same conclusion a year before the Police Task Force report was
released. 6
The Police Task Force did find that "excessive force re-
mains a serious problem in parts of the South . . . and still
remains as a significant problem outside the South as well."6
The "excessive force" referred to in the report relates to the
manner in which the police reputedly dealt with blacks, civil
rights workers and people whom they consider to be undesira-
bles. There were no references made to police interrogation
practices per se.
In its aggregate report, the Commission states that, "today
the third degree is almost nonexistent. . . and few Americans
regret its virtual abandonment by the police.""8 In noting that
many police officers and citizens assume that court decisions
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967) [hereinafter cited as the TASK FORCE
REPORT].
65. Id. at 181-82. The "earlier studies" cited in the TASK FORCE REPORT are the
WICKERSHAM REPORT, the 1947 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, and
the 1961 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT.
66. See Rasberry, Physical Violence May Be Gone But Police Brutality Still Exists,
The Washington Post, May 27, 1966, sec. B, at 1, col. 1.
67. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 64, at 182.
68. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 93.
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render the police's job of protecting the public more arduous,
the Commission holds that this is partly due to the fact that:
[M]any . . . court decisions were made without the needs
of law enforcement, and the police policies that are designed
to meet those needs, being effectively presented to the court
. . . . As a result, the courts often must rely exclusively on
intuition and common sense in judging what kinds of police
action are reasonable or necessary, even though their deci-
sions about the actions of one police officer can restrict police
activity in the entire nation. 9
The Commission offers the Court's use of police manuals and
textbooks in Miranda as an illustration of this assumption."
The Commission's failure to delve into the question of po-
lice interrogation practices and confessions as they relate to
court decisions was objectionable to several of the commission-
ers. Seven of the nineteen members inserted "additional
views" on the issue into the final report. Generally, the com-
mentators averred that an unmitigated application of the
Miranda rule would virtually eliminate pretrial interrogation.7
The primary concern of the minority members can be summa-
rized in the following quotation:
It is. . . true that the danger of abuse and the difficulty of
determining "voluntariness" have long and properly con-
cerned the courts. Yet, one wonders whether these acknowl-
edged difficulties justify the loss at this point in our history
of a type of evidence considered reliable and so vital to law
enforcement."
B. The 1967 House Hearings-Anti-Crime Program7
By 1967, crime had become a compelling national problem
and, consequently, an important issue in the Congress. In his
February 6, 1967 Special Message on Crime in America to the
Congress, President Johnson outlined his program for confront-
ing the dilemma. Included in his plan of action were the Safe
Streets and Crime Control Act of 1967, a gun control law, a
unified federal corrections system, a witness-immunity law, a
69. Id. at 94.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 304.
72. Id. at 306.
73. Hearings, Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. of the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as the 1967 House Hearings].
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narcotics convention, a proposed agency for making federal
court administration more effective and an anti-wiretapping
measure .74
Extensive hearings on the House version of the
administration's anti-crime legislation (HR 5073) were held
during March and April of 1967. Even though none of the pro-
posed legislation dealt specifically with police interrogation
practices, some comments relating to the topic were voiced at
the hearings. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, for ex-
ample, was questioned extensively concerning his impressions
of the Miranda ruling and its ramifications. Mr. Clark champi-
oned the Court's action in Miranda and minimized the role of
confessions, generally, in the "total criminal justice process.' '7
He was, however, adamant in his assurance that law enforce-
ment officers were no longer extorting confessions. 76
In their testimony, several congressmen proposed that legis-
lation be drafted for counteracting what they considered to be
an "overzealous" Court.77 Others rebuked both the President's
Crime Commission and proponents of the administration's
anti-crime proposal for not taking into account the problems
that were reputedly being provoked by Supreme Court deci-
sions.78 Lastly, some offered specific legislation to cope with the
situation. For example, Robert Taft, Jr. offered a bill, The
Federal Interrogation Act of 1967 (HR 7384), that was designed
to permit three hours of interrogation under the scrutiny of a
special court official. The measure also contained penalties for
deterring overzealous police officers.79
In addition to comments offered by congressmen and other
governmental officials, testimony regarding police interroga-
tion practices was tendered by several functionaries of the
criminal justice system. One prominent police official claimed
that "the Miranda decision has almost, if not completely,
taken the police out of the inquiry system. ' 8° Subsequent em-
pirical studies, however, have discounted suggestions that
74. See Crime and Justice in America, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE (1968),
at 13-27. No legislation was offered by the administration to offset any court decisions.
75. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 45.
76. Id. at 70-71.
77. See, e.g., the statement of William McCullock (R-Ohio). Id. at 297.
78. On this point see the remarks of Richard Poff (R-Va.). Id. at 1418-24.
79. Id. at 1453-55.
80. See the statement of Orlando Wilson, then Superintendent of the Chicago
Police Department. Id. at 404.
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Miranda has had a discernible effect on the police's ability to
secure statements.
8
'
The most favorable testimonial in defense of police interro-
gation procedures was afforded by United States Federal Dis-
trict Court Judge William J. Campbell.2 Judge Campbell ear-
nestly questioned the correctness of what he depicted as being
the major premise of the Miranda decision, namely, "that the
prevailing practice in police custodial interrogation is to abuse
the constitutional rights of defendants." It was his belief that
"the invasion of individual rights incident to police custody is
a rare instance. '83
Since police confession and interrogation practices were not
paramount concerns of this committee, there was no significant
testimony offered to support the Court's decision. On the other
hand there were no imputations of police misfeasance in this
regard.
C. The 1967 Senate Hearings-Anti-Crime Program"
The Senate version of the administration's bill (S.917) was
not reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1967.
An amended measure, however, was passed by the Senate Ju-
diciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedures. The
amended measure added "Title II: Confessions and Eyewit-
ness" to the Act. This amendment was made for the purpose
of overturning the Mallory, Miranda, and Wade decisions. 5
Other amendments were offered to make confessions admis-
sible in the federal courts in instances where a trial judge had
affirmatively determined their voluntariness, to prohibit the
exclusion of confessions solely on the basis of a delay in arraign-
ment,86 and finally one which would have denied the preroga-
tive of review to the federal courts on any issue of voluntariness
81. See, e.g., Seeburger and Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study,
29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 passim (1967); Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L. J. 1519 passim (1967); Witt, The Impact of the Miranda Decision
on Police Procedures and Morale, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Southern California, 1970) at 97-146.
82. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 1488-92.
83. Id. at 1491.
84. Hearings, Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as the 1967 Senate Hearings].
85. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 318 (1967) (making identification based on a
police lineup when no attorney was present inadmissible at trial).
86. S. 674, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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if the highest court in a state had deemed a confession to be
voluntary. 7 Although considerable testimony ensued concern-
ing these contentious amendments, there was no dialogue re-
lating directly to police interrogation practices. Most of the
testimony focused upon the fruits of improper police interroga-
tion procedures, i.e., confessions.
Germane to this analysis, however, is the testimony of sev-
eral jurists and other officials bearing upon the question of
police misfeasance. The following are representative samples of
these spokesmen's comments: Judge Lawrence Wren, Superior
Court, Flagstaff, Arizona, who later became the trial judge in
the Miranda retrial:
In the 6 years I spent in the county attorney's office, and in
the many more hours that I spent discussing these questions
and problems [allegations of police brutality] with other
prosecutors in Arizona, I have never come across a single case
of police coercion on a confession . . .8
Judge Oliver Schulingkamp, District Court, New Orleans,
Louisiana:
The proponents of the [Miranda] exclusionary rule argue
there is much police abuse and brutality. . ., and I feel this
has been much exaggerated. Of course there are some rotten
apples in any barrel . . . . But this does not mean that the
vast majority of police officers do those things.89
Quinn Tamm, Executive Director, International Association of
Chiefs of Police:
It has been my experience and my very strong feeling,
that the accusations and charges of police brutality are ex-
tremely exaggerated, overemphasized ..... .Thirty years
ago yes, but we are living in the present time, and if we have
to go back 30 years to look for faulty police practice, then I
question our thinking. . . . I can tell you without equivoca-
tion that this practice [police brutality] is not in existence
to any degree in the law enforcement agencies of our countries
today."
Aaron Kootz, District Attorney of Kings County, New York:
87. S. 1194, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
88. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 533.
89. Id. at 851.
90. Id. at 336.
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I, in this 17 years I have been in office, have never seen those
pamphlets [the Inbau work on interrogation quoted in the
majority Miranda opinion]. They have no place, they have
never made an appearance at any station house in the city
of New York."
During the subcommittee hearings there were a few con-
travening remarks by witnesses or liberal committee members.
The following statement by Senator Philip Hart epitomizes the
general feelings of the dissenters:
I know that we have, if any, very few police departments
where they beat up suspects any more, thanks in part to court
decisions. But now we have improved psychological tech-
niques which leave no blood, but can be perhaps just as influ-
ential in operating on a person held in custody.2
After changing the name of the bill to the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee
reported out the measure to the Senate for full debate. A group
of Senate liberals, led by Joseph Tydings and Hiram Fong,
spearheaded an effort to extirpate, or at least weaken, Title II
of the Act during floor debate in the Senate.
In his debate with proponents of the bill, Senator Tydings
cited, among other things, "the Spanish Inquisition," the "ex-
cesses of the Stuart Kings," Brown v. Mississippi,93 the Wicker-
sham Report, the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Report, and
cases involving alleged police brutality listed in the Miranda
decision as evidence for removing Title II from S.917.11 Senator
Tydings appeared to sum up his feelings when he stated:
These Court cases involving police brutality are exceptions.
I am hopeful that these shocking cases will become more and
more infrequent. But procedural protections must exist to
ensure that brutality does not again rear its ugly head. 5
After a heated floor debate and seven roll call votes, Title
II was passed in a revised form. In its final make-up, the law
91. Id. at 227.
92. Id. at 137. Also see the minority views of the liberal block of Senators on Title
II of S. 917 in S. Rept. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 147-60.
4
93. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
94. 114 CONG. REC. at 5887, 5888, 6006, and 6007 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tyd-
ings).
95. Id. at 5888.
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provided in part for the admission of confessions into evidence
provided they were voluntary, even though a confessor had not
been apprised of his or her constitutional rights. Again, as with
previous hearings and commission inquiries, no legitimate
empirical evidence was offered to establish that police interro-
gation practices were inherently brutal or being utilized to the
general detriment of the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are numerous practical arguments for judicial self-
restraint." This article has attempted to examine one of those
considerations, i.e., the Court's lack of the fact-finding re-
sources adequate for "informed policy choice." In Miranda the
arguments offered to substantiate the Court's decision were
rooted in logical analysis. In order to be valid, such an ap-
proach must emanate from empirically authenticated facts. As
the above analysis shows, this apparently was not the case in
Miranda. One could hypothesize, therefore, that Supreme
Court decisions are not the product of detailed and objective
judgments, but are more aptly manifestations of the Justices'
sentiments on basic issues of American democracy.
Although there are some indications that the Burger Court
is cognizant of the institutional boundaries of the American
judiciary,97 the lower courts appear to be all too willing to as-
sume the role of "Philosopher King. '9 8 When we have judges
utilizing our courts as investigatory bodies, actively adminis-
tering school systems, and authorizing the jamming of citizen's
band stations,9" the time has come to consider a stabilization
of our system of checks and balances.
96. See Devereux, Comments: An Appraisal of Judicial Restraint, 18 ST. Louis L.J.
86-90 (1973).
97. See, e.g., Gainesville Utilities Department v. Florida Power Commission, 402
U.S. 515 (1971); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); Federal Trade Commission v.
Sperry and Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676
(1972); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972); and Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
98. One great American jurist perceived the Supreme Court in similar terms when
he said:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in
charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.
See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
99. Shaw, A Judge Authorizes the Jamming of the 27 MHZ Citizen's Band, 23 LAW
AND ORDER 22 (December, 1975).
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Several decades ago one of our more renowned jurists, the
late Justice Louis Brandeis, heeded our courts' limited means
for fact-finding and offered the famous Brandeis Brief as a
solution.'"" Brandeis believed that our courts' decision-making
processes would be enhanced if they were proyided with social
and economic facts. The author believes that the concept of
judicial decisions engendered from factual data is not out-
moded. It is almost certain that the adoption of such an ap-
proach by our activist jurists would lead to a more restrained
form of judicial decision-making. In the ultimate it would pro-
mote a process of judicial determination that is more compati-
ble with the tenets of representative democracy.
100. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

